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REFERENDUM ZONING: CITY OF EASTLAKE
V. FOREST CITY ENTERPRISES, INC.
Municipal land use planning has long been required in the zoning
process. I However, the need for regional land use planning has recent-
ly been recognized2 since there are situations in which the interests and
needs of suburban and urban land use planning overlap. 3 The prior
failure to recognize the need for comprehensive planning is illustrated
by the isolationist zoning practices of many suburban municipalities4
which are discriminatory in effect and frustrate the achievement of
orderly community development. 5 Recently, however, the United
States Supreme Court dealt a heavy blow to comprehensive planning.
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,6 the Supreme
Court held that a municipality may choose to require referendum
approval before any zoning change becomes effective.7
I. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (exercise of the
police power in the regulation of land use is constitutionally valid if it meets the double
standard of reasonableness and substantial relation to general community welfare and
the legislation is presumptively valid if made upon painstaking consideration).
2. See NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R.
Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Freilich & Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential
Controls-The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009,
1024-26 (1974); Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 199 (1955).
3. See generally BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, note 2 supra; see also Bertsch &
Shafer, A Regional Housing Plan: The Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission
Experience, 1 PLANNER'S NOTEBOOK (Am. Institute of Planners 1971); Craig, The Dayton
Area's "Fair Share" Housing Plan, Crrv (Jan. 1972).
4. See generally BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, note 2 supra.
5. Isolationist zoning practices which have a discriminatory effect are indistinguish-
able from exclusionary zoning practices. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). See also Note,
Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971); Note, Snob
Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a Castle? 69 MICH. L. REV. 339 (1970); Note, Snob
Zoning-A Look at the Economic and Social Impact of Low Density Zoning, 15 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 507 (1964); Note, Alternatives to Warth v. Seldin: The Potential Resident
Challenger of an Exclusionary Zoning Scheme, 11 URBAN L. ANN.223 (1976). For a
discussion of discriminatory ordinances, see 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING, §§ 8.01-.07 (4th ed. 1975).
6. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
7. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976).
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Eastlake is but one of more than a dozen suburbs surrounding
Cleveland, Ohio, which requires some form of mandatory referendum
on zoning decisions. 8 Eastlake adopted a city charter amendment
which required every land use decision, after consideration and ap-
proval by both the city planning commission and the city council, to be
approved by fifty-five percent of those voting in a mandatory referen-
dum election before the proposed change would become effective. 9
Forest City Enterprises' application for the rezoning of an eight-acre
parcel from -industrial to high-rise multi-family residential had been
approved by both the planning commission and the city council. How-
ever, the proposed change failed to get the fifty-five percent 10 majority
approval in the referendum election.
Forest City Enterprises challenged the charter amendment as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the people. The
Ohio Supreme Court agreed and held that the delegation violated
settled state law practice and federal due process guarantees because
the voters were given no standards to guide their decision." The
United States Supreme Court reversed holding that the city charter as
amended did not violate due process as an improper delegation be-
cause the referendum, when properly applied to a decision of commu-
8. Eighteen Greater Cleveland communities have now adopted versions of mandatory
referenda on zoning. Each requires majority approval by referendum for zoning changes
to multi-family units. See Voter Control of Zoning Kills Most Projects, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, July 18, 1976, § 1, at 2, col. 1. All zoning changes, whether on the petition of
individual property owners or at the initiative of municipal officials, have in fact been
virtually halted. For example, after full approval by their respective legislative bodies,
suburban voters have vetoed these changes: rezoning an eight-acre parcel from industrial
to apartment (Eastlake, May, 1972); three proposals to vacate alleys (Eastlake, May,
1974, Nov., 1974); rezone parcel from suburban (5-acre minimum) to multi-family
(Eastlake, Nov., 1974); rezone parcel from research-manufacturing to industrial park
and single family (Parma, Nov., 1974)); two proposals to rezone lots from two-family to
single family (Parma, Nov., 1975); and rezone parcel from single family to public
building for the Temple-on-the-Heights (Pepper Pike, Nov., 1974). Id. The irrationality
of voter reaction was dramatized in Pepper Pike where voters approved a bond issue to
build a municipal garage while simultaneously refusing, by referendum, to rezone the lot
next to the village hall necessary to construct the garage. Brief for Appellant for
Further Proceedings Upon Mandate from the United States Supreme Court, Forest City
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E. 2d 740 (1975).
9. Eastlake City Charter, Art. VII, § 3.
10. The 55% super-majority aspect was not challenged, but presumably the Court's
ruling in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (a 60% super-majority requirement in an
election held not violative of the fourteenth amendment) would similarly "cover" the
55% super-majority status of the Eastlake ballot.
11. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187,324 N.E. 2d
740 (1975).
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REFERENDUM ZONING
nity concern, is a power reserved to the state's citizens by the Ohio
Constitution. 12
The applicability of the referendum process to zoning ordinances is
dependent upon state law. Generally, the authorizing state enabling act
or home rule grant limits the referendum to matters of legislative
decision-making. 13 If legislative powers are reserved by the people in
the state constitution, the use of referenda is not violative of due
process on grounds of improper delegation of legislative power. 14 If the
determination by the local decision-maker is "quasi-judicial" or "ad-
ministrative," the decision lies outside the scope of referendum ap-
plicability because there are fundamentally required procedures for
"administrative" or "judicial" actions. 5 Thus, the application of the
12. 426 U.S. at 679. The Supreme Court specifically stated that its decision was
confined to the federal due process grounds of the Ohio decision. Id. at 677 n. 11. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison).
13. The authorization for the use of a referendum is found in the state constitution, a
statute or in the home rule charter.See 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 3.01 (4th ed. 1975). The reservation of legislative power to be exercised by
referendum is limited to legislative acts. See, e.g., Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. South Euclid,
110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180, appeal dismissed, 170 Ohio St. 585, 166 N.E.2d 924
(1960) (an amendment of zoning ordinance was a legislative rather than administrative
measure, and so was one on which referendum was applicable); Dwyer v. City Council
of Berkeley, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 932 (1927) (an ordinance to reclassify zoning districts
and authority to erect structures is subject to referendum). For a general discussion on
the history of the referendum, see J. WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
LAW-THE LAW MAKERS 37-39 (1950); C. LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAW OR POPULAR
PARTICIPATION IN LAW MAKING 358-69 (1909); E. PHELPS, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM (1914); H. WALKER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 451-55
(1948).
14. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Formerly, it was held that a
zoning amendment by referendum was violative of due process because the electorate
was uninformed of the proper zoning classifications and was unable to evaluate the
amendment in light of the comprehensive plan. City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103
Ariz. 204,439 P.2d 290 (1968); Korash v. City of Livonia, 388 Mich. 737,202 N.W.2d 803
(1972); Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (App. Div. 1973); Elkind v.
City of New Rochelle, 5 Misc. 2d 296, 163 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 838, 181
N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958). As the Eastlake Court found, due process merely requires notice
and hearing for the referendum to be constitutionally sufficient. Accord, Johnston v.
City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958); Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. South
Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180, appeal dismissed, 170 Ohio St. 585, 166
N.E.2d 924 (1960). The referendum in the zoning context meets the due process require-
ments of notice and hearing because both the planning commission and city council
decisions are made after public hearing. Unfortunately, as Rathkopf notes, if the elector-
ate is uninformed the notice and hearing are useless. I A RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING § 8.01-.07 (1975).
15. Compare Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915) (no constitutionally required procedures for legislative action) with Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (administrative actions must meet due process require-
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referendum to zoning decisions is dependent upon whether such a
decision is legislative or administrative.
Although the trend is to characterize a rezoning as "administrative"
or "quasi-judicial, '1 6 the majority of states still hold that a zoning
amendment is a legislative act.17 Because governmental decision-mak-
ing bodies, particularly at the local level, perform not only legislative,
but also executive and judicial functions, there is confusion in differ-
entiating legislative, executive and judicial functions. " The distinction
rests upon the relative impact of the action on the parties and the
community. Thus, the characterization is based on whether the action
produces a general rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of
ments). For a general discussion of the procedural requirements of judicial functions for
local administrative agencies, see Merrill, The LocalAdministrative Agencies, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 775, 791-801 (1969).
16. The crucial test for distinguishing legislative action from administrative or execu-
tive action is whether the action taken was one making a law, or one executing or
administering a law already in existence. Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713
(1956). See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973):
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited
(judicial) review, and may be attacked only upon constitutional grounds for an
arbitrary abuse of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the
permiisible use of a specific piece of property should be changed is usually an
exercise of judicial authority and its property is subject to an altogether different
test.
Id. at 580-81, 507 P.2d at 26. See generally West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221
N.W.2d 303 (1974); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292,502 P. 327 (1927). For a
general discussion of this "administrative" quality of the zoning amendment, see R.
BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's Use in
Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 88 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Frankel v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 373, 363 P.2d 1063
(1961); Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959); Robinson v. City of
Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957); Tuber v. Perkins, 6 Ohio St. 2d
155, 216 N.E.2d 877 (1966); O'Rourke v. City of Tulsa, 457 P.2d 782 (Okla. 1969).
Legislative action carries with it the strong but rebuttable presumption of constitutionali-
ty. 1 R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.14 (2d ed. 1968). Generally, the
opponent of a legislative action must prove either by clear and convincing evidence, id.
at § 2.17, or beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at § 2.18, that the zoning amendments
embodied in an ordinance or regulation fail to bear a substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 368 (1926). See also STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (rev. ed.
1926); Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Ac-
tion, 33 OHIO ST. L. J. 130 (1972).
18. See, e.g., Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 62,217 A.2d 578,
582 (1966); B. BuRRus, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 108 (1963); 1 E.
YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 74 at 179 (1956).
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people or a more limited rule applicable toward specific individuals or
situations. 19
Regardless of whether the classification is deemed legislative or
administrative, certain standards must be satisfied or the zoning regu-
lation will violate the fourteenth amendment due process clause. In
Villiage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company2" the United States
Supreme Court held that a zoning regulation does not violate four-
teenth amendment due process if it is reasonable and bears a substan-
tial relationship to the public interest.21 This test balances the public
19. The Supreme Court in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915) illustrated the distinction:
A relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally
affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had a right
to a hearing. But that decision is far from reaching a general determination dealing
only with the principle upon which all the assessments in a county had been laid.
See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Tulsa, 457 P.2d 782, 786 (Okla. 1969) (Berry, C.J.,
dissenting).
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Two other "police power" cases are generally reviewed in
conjunction with Euclid: Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 228 U.S.
116 (1928) and Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). Roberge involved a
Seattle ordinance allowing the construction of a philanthropic home if the consent of
two-thirds of the property owners within four hundred feet of the proposed building was
obtained. Eubank considered the validity of a Richmond ordinance requiring a "commit-
tee on streets" to establish a building set-back line for all of the buildings in a particular
block whenever two-thirds of the property owners on the block objected to the proposed
use change. The Supreme Court invalidated each ordinance because the two-thirds
provision portions lacked standards to guide the exercise of the power. Thus, the police
power authorized in the ordinances was susceptible to arbitrary and capricious exercise.
21. 272 U.S. at 368 (1926). Interestingly enough, in Eastlake as well as in Euclid, the
ordinance was struck down on both state law practice and federal due process grounds.
Yet, in each case the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to review Ohio constitutional
law. For a discussion which proves that settled state law practice is state constitutional
law, see DixoN, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION, chs. 5, 6 (1968). Contrary to the Court's
reasoning, then, the question is not the same under both Constitutions. When the state
strikes down a regulation on the basis of a separable state due process issue, it identifies
a state law practice which may differ from federal due process notions. Indeed, more
and more state courts are construing state counterparts to federal constitutional rights to
guarantee broader rights than those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See,
e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976)
(California constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is upheld despite conflicting
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)
(state has constitutional right to impose higher standards on searches and seizures);
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (developing municipality which adopts land
use regulation to preclude low-income housing has violated state constitutional due
process and equal protection provisions). See also United States Supreme Court Justice
Brennan's comment concerning the need for active state courts, 62 ABA J. 993, 994
(1976).
Thus, once the presence of a separable state issue is identified, the Supreme Court
loses its jurisdiction. Although the Ohio Supreme Court failed to identify for the
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interest in health, safety, morals and general welfare with the public
interest in private property. 22 Moreover, the Court concluded in Euclid
that the regulation is presumptively valid if it received "painstaking
consideration" by the enacting authority.23
Supreme Court its discussion of the settled state law of due process (requiring stan-
dards), it may clarify this issue if it decides to rehear the case on remand. The Ohio
constitutional issues, therefore, are now ripe for decision. Brief for Appellant for
Further Proceeding Upon Mandate From the United States Supreme Court at 6-7, Forest
City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975).
22. If it be a proper exercise of the police power to relegate industrial establish-
ments to localities separated from residential sections, it is not easy to find a
sufficient reason for denying the power because the effect of its exercise is to divert
an industrial flow from the course which it would follow, to the injury of the
residential public if left alone, to another course where such injury will be obviated.
It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases where the general
public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way.
272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926) (emphasis added). It is imperative to recognize the essence of
the balancing process the Court outlines in Euclid. Although Euclid has the power to
regulate the course of the industrial flow (from Cleveland to the suburbs), the Court
recognizes that this grant of power is limited by those cases in which the general public
interest is greater than the interest of the municipality. Eastlake is silent on this point
although the dissent avers to such a theory. 426 U.S. at 680-95. Euclid supports the
notion that there can be a greater public interest in zoning than that of the lone
municipality. Perhaps such a greater public interest is met in the conception that all
suburbs must share the burdens of providing sufficient housing to meet the needs of an
expanding urban population.
23. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Accord Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927). However,
zoning laws and regulations must also satisfy the requirements of the constitutional
guaranty of equal protection of the laws. See, e.g., Dennis v. Village of Tonka Bay, 64 F.
Supp. 214 (D.C. Minn.), aff'd, 56 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1946).
Courts have imposed a strict burden of proof on local decision-making bodies to show
that they have engaged in deliberation necessary and sufficient to be presumed valid.
Illustrations of the imposition of a stricter burden of proof are listed below.
(i) "Spot-zoning" or zoning of individual pieces of property in a manner which
varies from that prescribed in the comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance may be
improper, but it is not illegal in all cases. Katobimor Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 144,
118 A.2d 824 (1955); Partain v. City of Brooklyn, 138 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio Comm. P1. 1955),
aff'd, 101 Ohio App. 279, 133 N.E.2d 616 (1956). Spot-zoning is also to be considered in
relation to the general welfare. Schmidt v. Bd. of Adjustments of Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 88
A.2d 607 (1952); Partain v. City of Brooklyn, 138 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio Comm. P1. 1955),
aff'd 101 Ohio App. 279, 133 N.E.2d 616 (1956). But the general rule is that the
amendment is designed to serve the best interests of the community as a whole and in
accordance with a comprehensive plan. See, e.g., Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 214
Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957). Cf. Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning
Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60, 61-65 (amendment often employed for limited
changes in use of one lot). See generally I R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING, §§ 5.04-5.13 (1968). The requirement that a zoning ordinance be in accordance
with a comprehensive plan is intended to avoid an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
the zoning power. A zoning ordinance which is not formulated on a comprehensive plan
is an unreasonable exercise of the police power, and, therefore, unconstitutional. See
N.T. Hegeman Co. v. Mayor of Borough of River Edge, 6 N.J. Super. 495, 69 A.2d 767
(Vol 14:319
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The Ohio Supreme Court in Eastlake recognized that a referendum
requirement for an "administrative" decision is invalid. However,
ruling that rezoning is "legislative," 24 the Ohio court held that rezoning
by referenda is an invalid delegation of legislative power violative of
due process.25 The court reasoned that an exercise of the police power
designed to restrain the private use of land must be imbued with the
dual standard of reasonableness and substantial relation to the general
welfare. The underlying infirmity in Eastlake's charter amendment
was the absence of procedures to insure that those given the power to
regulate privately-owned land would apply the Euclid standards.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio ruling and held
that the use of a referendum to approve a zoning change was not an
unconstitutional delegation of power.26 Relying on the Ohio court's
characterization of rezoning as legislative, the Supreme Court found
that the Ohio law permitted a referendum in all matters assigned to the
legislature. In accordance with James v. Valtierra,27 the Court found
(1949). See generally Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154 (1955).
(ii) Several state courts have ruled that mere popular opinion expressed by a given
majority should not be the determinative factor in a rezoning. See, e.g., Jemison v. City
of Kenner, 277 So. 2d 728, 730 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Ford v. Baltimore County, 268 Md.
172,300 A.2d 204,211 (1973); Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Paris Township, 351 Mich.
434, 446, 88 N.W.2d 705, 711-12 (1958); DeSena v. Gulde, 24 App. Div. 2d 165, 171,265
N.Y.S.2d 239, 246 (1965).
(iii) Decisions to make or deny changes in the zoning ordinance must show evidence
of forethought and deliberation. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 470-71, 288
N.Y.S.2d 888, 894-95 (1968): "One of the key factors used by our courts in determining
whether the statutory requirement has been met is whether forethought has been given to
the community's land use problem .... " Accord, Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81
Wash. 2d 292, 295, 502 P.2d 327, 329 (1972).
24. The ruling that rezoning is legislative is not as clear as suggested by the Ohio
Supreme Court. See note 36 infra for a discussion of the current Ohio law characteriz-
ing rezonings.
25. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d
740 (1975).
26. 426 U.S. at 672.
27. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Valtierra involved an authorization to a public body to
develop, construct or acquire low-rent housing. The California Supreme Court had
earlier held that actions of local housing authorities established to take advantage of
federal financing for low-rent housing were not subject to California's referendum
provisions. The California Constitution was then amended to provide that no public body
might develop, construct or acquire any low-rent housing until the project had been
approved at a referendum election. Citizens claiming they qualified for low-rent housing
challenged the referendum requirement on the basis that it effectively deprived them of
low-rent housing and was therefore violative of the supremacy clause, the privileges and
immunities clause, and the equal protection clause. The Court upheld the referendum as
a proper forum for public participation in community policy-making.
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the use of referenda to be an exercise of powers reserved to the
citizenry rather than an unconstitutional delegation of power. 28
The Court concentrated primarily on the issue of standards to guide
the electorate in their decision-making. Criticizing the Ohio court's
reasoning that standards were necessary, the Supreme Court felt that
since there is no more assurance that a legislative body will act consci-
entiously, standards were not necessary where the people acted as
legislators. 29 In addition, the Court stated that even the sovereignty of
the people is subject to constitutional limits and when a substantive
result is arbitrary, the referendum will be invalid.3"
In contrast, the dissent3' focused on the issue of whether due proc-
ess procedures were required in rezoning32 individual parcels of land.
The dissent found a need for fair procedures when dealing with indi-
vidual parcels because every zoning plan regularly provides for
changes and due process guarantees insure that the owner is afforded
protection in making legitimate use of his property. Consequently, the
28. See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1. The Court analogized this referendum power to the
New England town meeting. In both cases, the citizens were given a direct voice in
matters of public policy. 426 U.S. at 673 n.6.
29. 426 U.S. at 675-76 n.10.
30. The Supreme Court stipulated that its decision is inapplicable to the cases of
unnecessary hardship and that if the referendum result was challenged as unreasonable
or arbitrary the election could be set aside on the holding of Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (Akron housing ordinance election ballot set aside as worded
discriminatorily and a violation of equal protection). It is difficult to conceive, however,
how this would apply to ordinary rezoning requests which if turned down leave the
property owner with the zoning use which the property was assigned in the first instance,
prior to the request for change.
31. There were two dissenting opinions filed in Eastlake. In a short cryptic dissent,
Justice Powell agreed with the majority to the extent that a referendum would be
appropriate for generally applicable zoning law. But he found the referendum fundamen-
tally unfair when only one individual's property was in issue because the individual
property owner would have no realistic opportunity to be heard by the electorate. 426
U.S. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting). The other dissenting opinion was written by Justice
Stevens.
32. Justice Stevens' discussion of the character of the decision-maker provided an
opportunity to broaden the holding of the opinion which he wrote in Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). A broad reading of Mow Sun Wong intimates that due
process procedures require that a decision be made only by a decision-maker who is both
qualified and likely to consider all factors. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90
HARV. L. REV. 56, 111 (1976). This is Professor Tribe's "structural due process"
concept which requires that when a government body infringes on individual rights, the
government body must be both "proper" to consider the issues and it must reach its
determinations "fairly and responsively." See Tribe, The Emerging Reconnection of
Individual Design and InstitutionalRights: Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Due Process of
Law Making, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 433, 449 (1977).
[Vol. 14:319
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dissent found the legislative label inappropriate for rezoning actions.33
Furthermore, the dissent felt that a referendum rezoning is valid only
when issues of community-wide policy or public interest predomi-
nate.3
4
The crux of Eastlake is that the Supreme Court considers land use
policy a matter for the state courts to fashion. So framed, the issues in
Eastlake are two-fold: (1) whether rezonings of individual parcels are
characterized qua "legislative," thereby qualifying for the Euclid
style presumptive validity; and, (2) what will be the effect of manda-
tory referenda on all land use changes for rational land use planning,
for the development process, for development costs, and in social
terms, for continued suburban segregation.
The proper characterization of a rezoning is currently debated, but
the labelling distinction has considerable significance for the exercise
of power in referendum zoning. Basically the determination of the
character of the decision depends on whether the action produces a
general policy applicable to the entire community or one with a more
limited application. 35 Utilizing this approach, a rezoning is properly
characterized as an administrative action. The Supreme Court's adher-
ence to the Ohio label circumvented the characterization issue36 and as
a result it is inconsistent with the current trend in state law which holds
rezoning to be an administrative function. 37
33. 426 U.S. at 686 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found that the
requirement for fair procedures should not depend on the label which a state court
chooses to apply.
34. 426 U.S. at 693. Mr. Justice Stevens' argument at this point is a classical constitu-
tional argument reminiscent of Justice Jackson's decision in Youngstown Steel & Tubing
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Compare City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (three-pronged analysis focusing on the
general public interest threat, no threat to the public interest, and needs of the individual
property owner) with Youngstown Steel & Tubing v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (three-
pronged analysis focusing on the appropriateness of an executive order where Congress
has explicitly authorized such power, not authorized the power, and where Congress has
made no comment).
35. This test of proper characterization is called the functional approach. It is best
summarized in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915). See note 19 supra.
36. The legislative classification of a rezoning is not as settled in Ohio as the Ohio
court suggested in Eastlake. In holding the rezoning legislative, the Ohio court cited
Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 (1968). But in
Donnelly, Ohio adopted the Nebraska rule of Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d
713 (1956), which held the rezoning administrative and therefore not subject to the
referendum.
37. See note 16 supra. See, e.g., Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 394 Mich. 531, 232
N.W.2d 584 (1975); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Nadasdy, 347 Minn. 159,
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The majority's reliance on James v. Valtierra38 further confused the
issue of whether rezoning is properly characterized as legislative. The
use of Valtierra reasoning presupposes a referendum question which
affects the entire community so that an election is justified.39 In East-
lake, however, no community-wide effect was alleged and the planning
commission and the city council found that no adverse community-
wide effect would result.W This use of Valtierra suggests that the
76 N.W.2d 670 (1956); Lowe v. City of Missoula, 525 P.2d 551 (Mont. 1974); Kelley v.
John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs and Markets,
Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or.
574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964). See also
Sullivan, From Kroner to Fasano: An Analysis of Judicial Review of Land Use Regula-
tion in Oregon, 10 WILL. L. J. 358 (1974).
38. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Valtierra involved an equal protection challenge to a Califor-
nia constitutional amendment requiring referendum approval before a public body could
develop, construct or acquire any low-rent housing. Federal courts have traditionally
upheld challenges to the referendum process by affirming its validity on inherent democ-
ratic qualities. Valtierra represents one of the few forays by the federal courts into the
referendum "thicket."
The only other referendum case in federal court which raised a due process claim is
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). Hunter was, however, decided on equal
protection grounds. The early cases reaching the Supreme Court and challenging the
validity of referendum laws asserted violations of Art. IV, § 4 of the United States
Constitution. That section guarantees every state a republican form of government.
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v. Portland, 223
U.S. 151 (1912). The cases were dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the court felt
that the questions presented were political and governmental in nature and ipso facto,
solely within the Congressional power. Id. at 151. These cases were decided before the
Court decided it could enter the "political thickets" in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). See, R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION (1968).
Recently, federal courts have taken jurisdiction on challenges to referenda on equal
protection grounds. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1971); Ranjel v. City of
Lansing, 417 F.2d 321,324 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970); Spaulding v.
Blair, 403 F.2d 862, 863-64 (4th Cir. 1968). Ranjel is particularly interesting because it
was an appeal by poor Blacks and Americans of Mexican descent to enjoin a referendum
on a spot-zoning ordinance which allowed a low-income housing project. They brought
an equal protection suit but the Court held that the referendum was facially neutral. The
political question issue did not surface and generally no longer does.
39. The Supreme Court's analysis presupposes that the particular issue in question is
appropriate to a referendum before the entire electorate of the municipality. The Court
relied on a passage from Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union
City, 424 F.2d 291,294 (9th Cir. 1970) (SASSO sued to enjoin the city from following the
result of a city-wide referendum nullifying an ordinance rezoning which permitted
construction of federally-financed housing for low- and moderate-income families). The
decision says that it is appropriate to allow the city itself to legislate through its voters in
overriding the views of their elected representatives as to what best serves the public
interest. Id.
40. III addition, one might argue that given that the Eastlake comprehensive plan was
validly adopted, that Eastlake's ordinance was in accordance with that plan, and that the
amendment was endorsed by the planning commission after hearings, the decision by the
electorate is both arbitrary and capricious in terms of rational land use planning.
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referendum may be utilized even when no question of community-wide
concern is at the issue.
The terminological analysis is crucial in terms of its practical effects
on development costs. The referendum itself is costly and time-con-
suming. It results in a shift of the burden of persuasion to the property
owner who seeks the change for his parcel of land. If the voters reject
the property owner's proposal he must now prove that the pre-existing
classification is an arbitrary and capricious taking of property. Before
Eastlake a developer need only have shown to the municipality that
the rezoning was desirable and compatible with the comprehensive
plan and the community welfare. The existing classification will rarely
be so arbitrary as to amount to a taking of property. In addition, the
administrative relief qua a variance which is available if the voters
reject the rezoning, is contrary to the general rule of land use law that a
variance is only available for major revisions in land use.41
Most importantly, Eastlake represents a failure to recognize the
realities of urban regions. The referendum zoning practice of Eastlake
is a common reaction of no-growth oriented enclaves and is illustrative
of exclusionary practices of suburbs nationwide.4 2 The "Eastlake so-
lution," the referendum zoning requirement, is an effectively exclu-
sionary practice which frustrates comprehensive planning of commu-
nity and regional development. The community interest of the subur-
ban municipality, as expressed in a referendum, has overreached the
general community interest of the larger urban community.
Gerald Goulder
41. In footnote 13, the majority asserted that variance relief is available to the
developer in Eastlake. 426 U.S. at 679 n. 13. This assertion, however, is misguided. The
majority cited 8 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.159 (3d ed. 1976) for their
suggested remedy. However, MCQUILLAN at § 25.160 clearly illustrates that a variance
should not and is not used to rezone a scheme in essentials. Furthermore, the availability
of the variance for relief is subject to a developer's interest in the property before even
applying for a variance. Id. at § 25.162(a). Only the most aggressive developer would
gamble on "winning" a referendum rezoning in contemplation of purchasing property.
42. The true purpose of the Eastlake charter amendment requiring the referendum
eluded neither the Ohio court nor the dissenting Justices on the Supreme Court:
Zoning provisions such as that in Eastlake's charter have a single motive, and that
is to exclude, to build walls against the ills, poverty, racial strife and the people
themselves, of our urban areas. . .. The inevitable effect of such provisions is to
perpetuate the de facto divisions in our society between black and white, rich and
poor.
41 Ohio St. 2d at 190, 324 N.E.2d at 749 (Stem, J., concurring). Justice Stevens in dissent
cited this passage, 426 U.S. at 689.
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